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ARE DISCRETIONARY COMMODITY TRADING
ACCOUNTS INVESTMENT CONTRACTS?
THE SUPREME COURT MUST
DECIDE
Trading in commodity futures contracts' takes place in a volatile and un-
predictable market that demands quick investment decisions. An investor
may choose to allow a broker to make those decisions without any consulta-
tion through employment of a discretionary trading account.2 If an investor
elects to trade in commodity futures in this manner, he or she may or may
not be able to invoke the sanctions and protections of the federal securities
laws to remedy fraud or other wrongful conduct in the handling of the ac-
count. Because the commodity futures contracts themselves are not securi-
ties, the availability of the federal securities laws for remedial purposes
depends entirely on whether the discretionary trading account itself meets
the definition of investment contract employed in the federal circuit where
the investor initiates suit.3
1. "A commodity future is a standardized contract for the purchase and sale of a fixed
quantity of a commodity to be delivered in a specified future month at a price agreed upon
when the contract is entered into." Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
622 F.2d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC
RULE 10B-5 § 4.6, at 82.181 (1975)). Courts generally agree that commodities futures con-
tracts themselves do not represent investment contracts. Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1978); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669, 671 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995, 998-99 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Sinva v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2. A discretionary commodity trading account is generally characterized by a customer
who makes a large initial deposit with a broker and allows the broker to trade in the account
with complete discretion and without any consultation. Discretionary accounts are particu-
larly well-suited to commodities trading because the market is extremely volatile and decisions
must be made quickly. Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and
Preemptions, I J. CORP. L. 217, 248 (1976).
3. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act states:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group
or index of securities (including any interest therein based on the value thereof), or
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities ex-
change relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument, com-
monly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
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The Supreme Court has enunciated a three-part test to determine whether
an investment contract exists.4 There must be an investment of money, in a
common enterprise, with profits dependent upon the managerial efforts of
others.' A deep split in the federal circuit courts has developed over the
criteria necessary to satisfy the second element of that test. As a result, a
discretionary commodity trading account may constitute an investment con-
tract in some circuits, though not in others.6 The facts of each case are
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 stat. 74, as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-303, § 1, 96 Stat.
1409 (1982) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982)) (emphasis added).
Section 3(c)(10) of the 1934 Act provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or
other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certifi-
cate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in gen-
eral, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency
or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Security Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 stat. 882, as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-303, § 2,
96 Stat. 1409 (1982) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982)) (emphasis added).
4. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
5. The Howey court stated: "[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party
... " 328 U.S. at 298-99. In United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the
Supreme Court modified the last clause of the Howey test. The Court omitted the word
"solely" and stated that a reasonable expectation of profits should exist based on the "en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852. The Court also stated that the
Howey test, "in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the
Court's decisions defining a security." Id. The Court found that a sale of stock in a non-profit
housing cooperative did not constitute a security because the investor-broker relationship that
existed in the case lacked the expectation of profits element of the Howey test. Id. at 857.
6. This Note will not discuss the difficult problem the circuit split causes when attempts
are made to determine whether other financial instruments or investment schemes constitute
investment contracts. See, e.g., Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th
Cir. 1984) (model home sale-leaseback transactions were held not to constitute securities be-
cause no showing was made of an investment in a common venture or horizontal commonality
since "the fate of each purchaser's investment was [not] tied to that of the other investors
through a common scheme"); SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 355 (6th Cir. 1984)
(horizontal commonality was held present in trust accounts, joint ventures, and escrow ac-
counts); United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986
(1983) ("Because the proof shows that the fortunes of the investors were linked with those [of
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critical to the determination of whether a security is involved.
In January of this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit considered an appeal from an order for summary
judgment in a case7 that centered in part on the definition of investment
contract. Newcomb Securities Company8 claimed that its law firm wrongly
advised it not to register the discretionary commodity trading account it in-
tended to offer with the Securities and Exchange Commission.9 It claimed
that this left the company potentially liable for securities laws violations and
penalties.'° The court of appeals noted that the dispute turned on whether
the instruments Newcomb intended to offer were investment contracts." If
the instruments were investment contracts, they would qualify as securities
under the definitions in the Securities Act of 193312 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.13
The court noted a further problem. Newcomb planned to market the in-
struments in the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits where different criteria
have developed for identification of an investment contract.' 4 A common
enterprise element must be established before an investment contract can
exist. The federal circuits differ on what they will accept as sufficient criteria
to establish a common enterprise among investors and brokers. The Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that a common enterprise can
exist as long as the investor has placed money with a broker and depends on
that broker for profit.' 5 The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits state that a
common enterprise consists of multiple investors who pool funds together
into a joint venture controlled by the broker. 6 The Ninth Circuit requires
that the investor's success or failure must depend on the broker and that the
broker's success or failure must depend on how well she performs for the
investor before it will recognize a common enterprise.17 In regard to a case
the] promoters, the requisite commonality [in a sale-leaseback transaction] has been estab-
lished."); Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., No. 84-4617, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1985).
7. Popham, Haik, Schnobrich, Kaufman & Doty, Ltd. v. Newcomb Sec. Co., 751 F.2d
1262 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
8. Newcomb Securities Company was one of two partnerships and five corporations con-
trolled by the defendants. Id.
9. Popham, 751 F.2d at 1264-65.
10. Id. at 1265.
11. Id. Investor funds placed in accounts would be reinvested by the defendants in com-
modity futures and in transactions involving foreign currencies and government securities. Id.
12. See supra note 3.
13. Id.
14. Popham, 751 F.2d at 1265. See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 102-49 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. If the investor loses money while at the
same time the broker handling those funds earns money, the Ninth Circuit will not recognize a
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dealing with this issue, the District of Columbia Circuit merely noted the
split in circuits, vacated the order for summary judgment, and remanded the
case for further proceedings.' 8
The Supreme Court faced but declined to resolve this same circuit split
when it denied, by a six to three vote, a petition for certiorari to the Ninth
Circuit in Mordaunt v. Incomco. 19 In Mordaunt,2° plaintiffs invested
thousands of dollars in a discretionary commodity trading account with In-
comco.2" Incomco directed the funds toward the purchase of commodity
futures contracts and had complete discretion with regard to investment de-
cisions.22 In just six months, the Mordaunts had lost approximately $27,000
while Incomco had, at the same time, earned more than $20,000 in commis-
sions." The Mordaunts filed suit in federal district court alleging against
Incomco several violations of state and federal securities laws.24 The district
court concluded that the discretionary commodity trading account consti-
tuted an investment contract.25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating
that the Mordaunt-Incomco relationship lacked the common enterprise ele-
ment necessary before an investment contract can exist.26 The court noted
that in the Ninth Circuit "there is no common enterprise unless there is
some direct relation between the success or failure of the promoter and that
of his investor."27 Because the Mordaunts had lost approximately $27,000
at the same time Incomco earned more than $20,000 in commissions, the
mutually dependent relationship required in the Ninth Circuit did not ex-
ist.28 The court rejected the Mordaunt's contention that the less stringent
definition of common enterprise of the Fifth Circuit should apply.29
common enterprise. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. In the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits, however, a common enterprise and investment contract will exist as long as the pro-
moter or broker exercises dominance over the funds invested, regardless of the financial out-
come. See infra note 55-78 and accompanying text.
18. Popham, 751 F.2d at 1266.
19. 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985) (White, J. with Bur-
ger, C.J. & Brennan, J. dissenting). "In light of the clear and significant split in the Circuits, I
would grant certiorari." 105 S. Ct. at 803.
20. 686 F.2d at 816.
21. Id. at 815.
22. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit at E3, Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1983).
23. Id. at C4.
24. Mordaunt, 686 F.2d at 816.
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The Supreme Court declined to hear the case." ° It left intact a circuit split
that pits the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits against the Third, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits in a dispute over the definition of the common enterprise
element of an investment contract. The Ninth Circuit has developed a third
definition.
This Note will provide an overview of this circuit split as it concerns dis-
cretionary commodity trading accounts. It will analyze each of the leading
appellate decisions from the circuits involved and the collective reasoning
involved on each side. This Note will conclude with a discussion of a uni-
form approach as an attempt to resolve this sharp split in the circuits.
I. SEC v. WJ. HowEY Co.: THE SEMINAL CASE
In SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.,3 1 the Supreme Court articulated the landmark
test for determining the existence of an investment contract. In Howey, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an action against the
W.J. Howey Company to enjoin it from using the mails and instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce in the offer and sale of unregistered securities in
violation of the Securities Act of 1933.32 Investors in Howey purchased
small parts of a 500-acre citrus grove owned by the company, and defend-
ants pooled the produce at harvest and distributed the net profit to
investors.33
The Supreme Court reversed lower court rulings to the contrary34 and
held that the Howey citrus investment scheme constituted an investment
contract. 35 The Court's three-part definition of an investment contract, re-
quiring a person to invest money, in a common enterprise, and depend on
the managerial expertise of another for profit, remains relevant today.36 The
Supreme Court fashioned this definition with the concern that too rigid or
exact a test would lead to the development of efforts to circumvent it.
37
Such a test, the Court postulated, would defeat the remedial intent of Con-
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
31. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
32. Id. at 294.
33. Id. at 295.
34. Id. at 301, rev'g, 151 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945), and 60 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Fla. 1945).
35. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
36. See supra note 5.
37. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The Court noted that the test "embodies a flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."
Id. The Court also stated that "[t]he statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors
is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." Id. at 301.
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gress when it enacted the securities statutes.38 Unscrupulous traders could
easily invent ways to defeat a narrow definition of investment contract,
whereas Congress intended the securities laws to reach broadly. 39 In addi-
tion, state courts had established a broad definition of investment contract
prior to passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts." The Court reasoned
that because Congress was aware of these decisions when it enacted the se-
curities statutes, it must have intended a similarly broad approach.4'
Courts that apply the Howey definition today usually separate the test into
component parts for the purposes of analysis.42 Courts first look for an in-
vestment of money, then for the existence of a common enterprise, and fi-
nally for investor expectation of profits from the efforts of others. A plaintiff
must meet each of these elements in order to satisfy the Howey test and
invoke the sanctions and protections of the securities laws.
4 3
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COMMONALITY
A circuit split has developed over the criteria necessary to establish the
second prong of the three part Howey test, or what constitutes a common
enterprise. The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits state that a broadly de-
fined "vertical commonality" will suffice for that purpose. In these circuits,
vertical commonality means a relationship between an investor and a broker
that is characterized simply by promoter dominance over investor funds.
Multiple investors are not necessary, nor must the investors pool funds.
However, in the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, multiple investors and
pooling of funds, or "horizontal commonality," must be present to create a
common enterprise. It is important to note that the Fifth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits recognize a common enterprise if pooling or multiple inves-
tors exist. Vertical commonality sets a floor, not a ceiling in those circuits.
The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, however, will accept no less than
horizontal commonality. The Ninth Circuit fits into neither of these catego-
ries, having developed its own version of vertical commonality.
38. Id. at 299.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 298 & n.4.
41. Id. at 298.
42. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
43. See Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447, 452-54
(N.D. Ohio 1976) (court found that a nondiscretionary trading account in commodity futures
was not an investment contract because the investor's profits did not depend on the efforts of
the promoter).
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A. Vertical Commonality
In the Ninth Circuit, the success or failure of the investor must depend on
the broker and vice versa. For example, if the investor loses money while at
the same time the broker earns money, a common enterprise will not exist.
Their fortunes must be interdependent. The Ninth Circuit definitively an-
nounced its common enterprise criteria for discretionary commodity trading
accounts in Brodt v. Bache & Co." In Brodt, the plaintiffs invested in a
discretionary commodity trading account with Bache by placing their
money in a local savings and loan association.45 They executed a form that
allowed Bache to withdraw money without the Brodts' authorization and
invest in commodity option contracts.46 Though Bache told the Brodts that
they could expect large profits, they found that after the agent had left the
company all of their money had been lost and that the company Bache had
set up to make the commodity purchases had gone bankrupt.47 The Brodts
then filed suit against the company.48
A lower court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Bache
and the Brodts appealed.49 Affirming the holding below, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the relationship between
the Brodts and Bache did not constitute an investment contract.50 The court
first rejected the pooling requirements of the horizontal commonality ap-
proach adopted in the Seventh Circuit and distinguished the Fifth Circuit's
more expansive view of vertical commonality. 5 The court then stated that
44. 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978). See SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459
(9th Cir. 1985) (demonstrating the continued vitality of the court's holding here and in the
Mordaunt case). "It is not necessary that the funds of investors are pooled; what must be
shown is that the fortunes of the investors are linked with those of the promoters, thereby
establishing the requisite element of vertical commonality." Id. at 463.
45. Brodt, 595 F.2d at 459.
46. Id. at 459-60. A commodity option contract entitles the purchaser to buy either a
specific commodity futures contract at a set price within a set period (call options), sell under
the same circumstances (put options), or do either (double or straddle options). Bromberg,
supra note 2, at 257. Partly because of its highly speculative nature, trading in agricultural
commodity options has been disallowed for some time, and only recently has Congress allowed
such trading to begin on a trial basis. H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1982).
47. Brodt, 595 F.2d at 460.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 462.
51. Id. at 461. The Fifth Circuit will recognize a common enterprise as long as the pro-
moter or broker exercises dominance over investor funds. It does not require that the success
or failure of the broker correlate directly with that of the investor. SEC v. Continental Com-
modities, 497 F.2d at 521. In Brodt, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Carman [a Ninth Circuit case suggesting application of the expansive approach em-
ployed by the Fifth Circuit] can be distinguished from the case at bar because the
success or failure of Bache as a brokerage house does not correlate with individual
1986]
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the Brodt-Bache relationship did not meet its criteria for a common enter-
prise because it was a " 'solitary' one."52 Because the success or failure of
the Brodts did not depend on the concomitant success or failure of Bache,
the court reasoned that the company merely provided investment counsel
and that no common enterprise existed.5 3 Similarly, in the Mordaunt deci-
sion this lack of mutual dependence between broker and investor led to the
failure of both plaintiffs' securities law claims.54
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a less restrictive defi-
nition of vertical commonality and apply it in a much less stringent manner
than the Ninth Circuit.5 5 The Fifth Circuit approach is illustrated in SEC v.
Continental Commodities Corp.,5 6 where the court considered an SEC corn-
investor profit or loss. On the contrary, Bache could reap large commissions for
itself and be characterized as successful while the individual accounts could be wiped
out .... Thus, since there is no direct correlation on either the success or failure
side, we hold that there is no common enterprise between Bache and Brodt.
595 F.2d at 461.
52. Id. at 462.
53. Id.
54. Mordaunt, 686 F.2d at 817. While the First Circuit has not spoken definitively on the
issue, a recent district court opinion suggests that the Ninth Circuit's version of vertical com-
monality has gained favor in the First Circuit. In Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 213 (D. Me. 1984), the court considered whether the plaintiff's dis-
cretionary stock option trading account with the defendant constituted an investment contract.
Relying on the Ninth Circuit's Brodt case, the First Circuit court concluded that the mere
investor-broker relationship present did not satisfy the common enterprise requirement of the
Howey definition because no mutual dependence existed. Id. at 216.
The court noted that the more liberal version of vertical commonality essentially leaves out
the common enterprise element of the Howey definition. Id. The court cited two Massachu-
setts district court opinions that had reached a similar conclusion, Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook
& Co., 528 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mass. 1981), and Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Mass.
1982), as authority. 597 F. Supp. at 216.
In Holtzman, plaintiffs opened a discretionary securities account with the defendant. 528 F.
Supp. at 11. After the value of their portfolio fell by more than half, plaintiffs initiated suit
against defendant alleging fraud, misrepresentation and other securities laws violations. Id.
The court held that plaintiffs' account did not constitute an investment contract because the
profits and losses of the individual investors and those of the brokers were not interdependent.
Id. at 16. In so ruling, the court stated that it adopted the narrower version of vertical com-
monality of Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Id. However,
District Court Judge McNaught noted that he believed horizontal commonality was the better
approach because the Howey decision required it. Id. at 15.
In Kaufman, plaintiffs brought suit alleging, among other counts, that the defendant sold
them a security (their stock option account) through the use of untrue statements and omis-
sions of material fact. 539 F. Supp. at 1096. The court allowed plaintiff's complaint to stand
because it alleged an interdependent broker-investor relationship. Id. at 1097. The court
stated that a mere commission arrangement was not enough, citing the Brodt definition of
vertical commonality as authority. Id.
55. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
56. 497 F.2d 516. See Rasmussen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer,
Inc., 608 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
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plaint seeking to enjoin Continental from alleged violations of the federal
securities laws. Continental offered investors the opportunity to invest in
options on commodity futures contracts under its auspices.57 As in most
cases in this area, the defendant company allegedly misrepresented the size
of potential profits associated with commodity options trading while mini-
mizing the enormous risks inherent in the commodities markets.5" The Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the SEC's action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the scheme involved did not
constitute an investment contract.59 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the requisite vertical
commonality between investor and broker existed.'
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia holding that the discretionary commodity
trading account involved in the dispute was an investment contract. Id. at 178. The district
court had cited the Continental Commodities decision as authority. Id. at 177. But see Mallen
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1105 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia challenged the continued vitality of the
Continental Commodities decision that discretionary trading accounts constitute investment
contracts. Id. at 1109. It held that the 1974 and 1982 amendments to the Commodity Ex-
change Act (CEA), which expanded the Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC)
jurisdiction to all dealings in commodities, precluded securities actions against discretionary
commodity trading account brokers. Id. at 1113-14. The court stated that to allow securities
actions to stand in disputes involving commodities would be "antithetical to the congressional
purpose in creating the CFTC." Id. at 1114. For further discussion of the CFTC's expanded
regulatory power over commodities and issues pertaining thereto, see infra notes 133, 161, and
accompanying text. It should also be noted that the Northern District of Georgia, previously
part of the Fifth Circuit, is now in the Eleventh Circuit, but that Fifth Circuit opinions are still
controlling precedent until the decisions are overturned by an en banc panel of the Eleventh
Circuit.
57. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d at 519. It is important to point out that the court
frequently referred to discretionary commodity trading accounts in its opinion. However, the
case actually dealt with trading in naked commodity options. Bromberg, supra note 2, at 260.
Naked commodity options are generally recognized as investment contracts. Id. "A naked
option is a simple, unsupported promise the writer (also called optionor, grantor, or seller)
makes to buy or sell a futures contract at a specified price during a specific period. The writer
is betting against a customer on how the market price of the contract will move." Id. at 257-
58. Despite this factual confusion, Continental Commodities has become a leading case for the
proposition that discretionary commodity trading accounts form investment contracts and,
hence, securities. Id. at 260.
58. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d at 519.
59. Id. at 518.
60. Id. at 522-23, 529. The case also contained an interesting procedural maneuver. The
SEC had raised two issues in the district court prior to its appeal. The first was whether the
trading in the naked options accounts constituted an investment contract. The second was
whether notes issued by Continental Commodities constituted securities. The notes were is-
sued to partially reimburse customers adversely affected when the trading in the naked options
was halted due to SEC action. Id. at 519-20. The district court reached only the first issue.
Id. at 520. The SEC wished to confine the appellate court to the second. Id. The Fifth Circuit
nevertheless decided to consider both issues in its decision. Id.
1986)
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The Fifth Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit in Brodt, specifically and vigor-
ously rejected the view of the Seventh Circuit that a pooling of investor
funds, or horizontal commonality, had to be present to establish a common
enterprise.6 ' Yet, the Continental Commodities court differed from the
Ninth Circuit by stating that rather than seeking mutual dependence, its
"critical inquiry" centered on whether the promoter of the scheme had exer-
cised total control over the investment decisions through its investment
counseling and whether the investors had essentially depended on the pro-
moter's expertise for their profits. 62 The Continental Commodities court,
however, quoted from a pre-Brodt Ninth Circuit case, 63 but did not interpret
that case to mean, as the Ninth Circuit has, that the success or failure of both
the promoter and the investor must be mutually dependent.
6 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took an equally
expansive view of the definition of investment contract in Commercial Iron
& Metal Co. v. Bache & Co.65 The dispute in this case centered on whether
the defendant's investment scheme involving copper futures contracts consti-
tuted an investment contract. The court noted that while the copper futures
contracts themselves were not securities, and despite the fact that Commer-
cial had actually taken delivery of the copper on several occasions, the in-
vestment scheme offered by Bache to Commercial could still qualify as an
investment contract.66 The court stated that possibly the only requirements
61. Id. at 522. The court stated that the language of one of its earlier decisions on the
issue, SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974), "casts aspersions
on the elevation of a pooling ingredient to exalted status in inquiries concerning a common
enterprise." 497 F.2d at 519.
62. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522.
63. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973). In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit stated its definition of common enterprise. This defi-
nition has been used by the Ninth Circuit to demonstrate why mutual dependence is necessary,
and by the Seventh Circuit to justify its horizontal commonality requirement. See Milnarik v.
M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). The foot-
note read "[a] common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven
with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third
parties." Glenn W. Turner, 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.
64. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522. The court stated that "the essential [ele-
ment is] that the success of the trading enterprise as a whole and customer investments individ-
ually is contingent upon the sagacious investment counseling of Continental Commodities."
Id. at 522-23. It has been argued that the Fifth Circuit's focus on whether or not the promoter
of the investment scheme controls trading decisions essentially eliminates any analysis of
whether a common enterprise exists and instead collapses that second part of the Howey defini-
tion of investment contract into the third part, i.e., whether an investor has a reasonable expec-
tation of profit from the efforts of others. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the Savino case).
65. 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973).
66. Id. at 42. Defendants argued that taking delivery of the copper made the transactions
nothing more than buying and selling the mineral with no investment scheme involved. See
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necessary to establish an investment contract in a discretionary commodity
trading account situation may be a representation of large profits and pro-
moter dominance over investment decisions.67
In Booth v. Peavey Company Commodity Services,6" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth and the Tenth Cir-
cuits in a broad interpretation of common enterprise. The plaintiff in the
Booth case had opened a commodity trading account with the defendant.69
He alleged that during a two-month period in 1968, the defendant had
churned, or traded excessively with his account to his detriment.7 ° The
Eighth Circuit affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant granted in a
lower court.71 While the court in the Booth opinion never specifically stated
its criteria for establishing a common enterprise, lower courts in that circuit
have interpreted the opinion to mean that only a one-on-one relationship
between broker and investor is necessary to establish a common enterprise.72
The actual question before the court was whether the plaintiff could bring an
action against Peavey for allegedly churning his discretionary commodity
trading account.73 Because the court stated that a private remedy for churn-
ing such an account was available under the securities laws, lower courts in
the Eighth Circuit have treated the accounts as securities.74
For example, in the oft-cited case of Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 75 the dis-
trict court stated first that the Seventh Circuit's horizontal commonality re-
quirement presented too strict a view of what constitutes a common
Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967). Continental offered to sell
investors live beavers, encouraged the investors to leave the maintenance of the beavers to
Continental, and ride the "road to riches." Id. at 468. Despite the fact that the promoter did
not retain ownership or control of the beavers, the court held that the investment scheme
orchestrated by the promoter with the promise of large profits constituted an investment con-
tract. Id. at 470. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit in the Milnarik case interpreted Continen-
tal Marketing to support horizontal commonality because the success of the individual
investors depended on the success of the beaver breeding and marketing venture as a whole.
Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 276. The Tenth Circuit was actually declaring that the profits of the
beaver investors depended solely on the efforts of the promoter while not supporting the view
that pooling, or horizontal commonality, must exist for the recognition of a common enter-
prise. Continental Mktg. Corp., 387 F.2d at 470.
67. Commercial Iron, 478 F.2d at 42-43.
68. 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970).
69. Id. at 134.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 135.
72. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for discussion of Marshall v. Lamson
Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974). See also Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
73. Booth, 430 F.2d at 133.
74. Id. See infro notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
75. 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
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enterprise. 76 The court noted that while horizontal commonality may repre-
sent a reasonable interpretation of the precise facts of the Howey situation, it
is still inconsistent with the general broad-minded tone of the opinion and
the remedial purposes of the securities law.7 The court noted that vertical
commonality rests more squarely on the intent of both the Supreme Court
and the Congress.78
Through a series of district court opinions, the Second Circuit appears to
have adopted the vertical commonality requirement, but debate continues
over whether to adhere to the broad view of vertical commonality champi-
oned by the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, or the more stringent stan-
dard of the Ninth.79
In Maheu v. Reynolds,"0 plaintiffs alleged that Reynolds stated it would
remain in total control of their commodity trading account, that the com-
pany would earn substantial profits for them, and that losses would amount
76. Id. at 489.
77. Id. at 488.
78. Id. at 488-89. This court opined that the Supreme Court's definition of investment
contract in the Howey case was intended to be applied in a broad manner with a good degree
of flexibility enabling courts "to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." Id. at 488 (quoting Howey, 328
U.S. at 299). The Marshall court noted that this broad definition would comport with what it
viewed as congressional intent that the 1933 and 1934 securities laws were remedial and should
be construed broadly. Id. at 489. In discussing vertical as opposed to horizontal commonality,
the court stated that
[a]t the very least, it is equally as plausible to conclude that the element of "common
enterprise" is satisfied when a single investor commits his funds to a promoter in
hope of making a profit as to conclude that the investor protection afforded by the '33
and '34 Acts and the complex regulatory scheme developed thereunder is available
only to those hapless capitalists who are not alone in their misfortune.
Id at 489.
79. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
80. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See Alvord v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 485
F. Supp. 848 (D. Conn. 1980). In Alvord a stock option discretionary trading account between
plaintiff and defendant constituted a common enterprise because it established "a one-to-one
relationship between an investor and an investment manager." Id. at 853. In other words, the
court required only "vertical commonality." Id. See also Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Johnson, the court cited opinions
holding a discretionary securities trading account to be an investment contract. Id. at 765.
Berman v. Orimex Trading Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discretionary com-
modity trading account in cocoa futures held to be an investment contract citing the Maheu
analysis for authority). But see Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865,
869 (D. Conn. 1977) ("Congress has made clear that it does not intend the securities laws to
apply to commodity transactions."); accord Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith v. Prometco Co., 470
F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,867 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See infra notes 133, 161, and accompanying text for
further discussion of CFTC preemption in this area.
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to no more than $5,000.8 Instead, a year later, plaintiffs alleged a loss of
more than $43,000 and lost profits totalling more than $287,000.82
The Maheu court carefully reviewed the facts of Howey, noting particu-
larly that the Supreme Court had overturned lower court opinions holding
that where only a one-on-one, investor-broker relationship exists, no com-
mon enterprise is present. 83 The court then plainly stated that "the joint
account may constitute a security even if there was no pooling arrangement
or a common enterprise among investors."'84 Significantly, this court added
no additional qualifications to its criteria.
However, in Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., " a recent Second Circuit case,
Judge Ward stated just as plainly that the broad version of vertical common-
ality does not comport with Howey. In Savino, the dispute centered not on a
discretionary commodity trading account, but on the defendant's alleged
mismanagement of stock and stock option discretionary accounts. 86 Never-
theless, the district court opinion illustrated pointedly the ongoing debate in
the Second Circuit over whether to adopt the narrow or broad view of verti-
cal commonality. The Savino court first noted that the Howey decision
called for an investor-broker relationship with some degree of interdepen-
dence, and cited the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Brodt and SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises for authority.87 The court stated that while some inter-
dependence must exist, courts adopting the horizontal commonality ap-
proach have not put forward any "convincing rationale" for their view that a
pooling of funds of several investors must also exist.88
The court then distinguished the broad view of vertical commonality
adopted by the Fifth Circuit.89 It stated that such a broad view essentially
omitted the common enterprise element of the Howey definition of an invest-
ment contract. 90 Without some degree of interdependence of investor and
broker success or failure, the common enterprise necessary under the Howey
81. Maheu, 282 F. Supp. at 425.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 429.
84. Id.
85. 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1237 n.ll (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
86. Id. at 1235.
87. Id. at 1238. See Brodt v. Bache, 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
88. Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1238. But see Darrell v. Goodson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,325, 97,349 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that "horizontal commonality" or a "pooling of the
monies of various investors . . . [is] necessary to the existence of the 'common enterprise' ").
89. Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1237-38. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
90. Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1237 n.ll.
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definition would lack substance. 9' Interestingly, however, the court then
questioned whether the Howey opinion ever actually justified the great im-
portance attached to the common enterprise element.92 The court cited one
commentator's viewpoint that a strict reading of the Howey common enter-
prise element is wrong and that all discretionary accounts ought to be con-
sidered securities regardless of the nuances of the investor-broker
relationship.9 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also appears
to have joined the vertical commonality group, although only three district
court opinions thus far deal with the issue of whether discretionary com-
modity accounts constitute investment contracts.94 Two of the opinions
state that such accounts are investment contracts; one holds the contrary. 9
91. Id.; see also Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., No. 84-4617 slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. June 25,
1985).
92. Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1237 n.ll.
93. Id. (citing Note, Discretionary Commodity Accounts as "Securities": Applying the
Howey Investment Contract Test to a New Investment Medium, 67 GEO. L.J. 269 (1978)).
94. Two Georgia district court options took the broader view of vertical commonality of
the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga.
1983) and Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co. 572 F. Supp 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Importantly,
however, the court in Westlake noted that the decisions of the Fifth Circuit remain binding in
the Eleventh until an en banc panel of the Circuit's appeal court decides to overrule them. 565
F. Supp. at 1339 n.7. In Westlake, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit's leading case on the
issue, Continental Commodities, to find that a class action suit could stand against the defend-
ants who handled some 4,700 accounts at issue in the suit. Id. at 1338. The plaintiffs alleged
that defendants sold unregistered securities and violated other applicable provisions of the
securities laws. Id.
In Taylor, one plaintiff brought a securities law action against Bear Steams after he allegedly
lost money in a series of unauthorized trades undertaken in his several discretionary commod-
ity trading accounts. 572 F. Supp. at 669. The court rejected the defendant's contention that
because the accounts did not represent securities, no rule lob-5 action was valid. Id. at 671-72.
The court also relied on Fifth Circuit opinions to find that the requisite broker-investor rela-
tionship without a pooling of funds or mutual dependence existed. Id. at 671. This, together
with promoter dominance over the accounts in the Taylor-Bear Stearns dealings, led the court
to conclude a common enterprise and investment contract existed. Id. Interestingly, the court
also cited the Savino case for authority on this point even though the Savino court actually
adopted the more stringent Ninth Circuit version of vertical commonality, which clearly did
not exist in the Taylor-Bear Stearns dispute. Id. But see Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 605 F. Supp. 1105, 1114 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (same district court held that the
commodities laws precluded application of the securities laws to discretionary commodity
trading accounts).
95. The Fourth Circuit has not yet spoken definitively on the issue either, but one district
court opinion dealt specifically with the question of whether discretionary commodity trading
accounts are investment contracts. In Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D.
Md. 1975), the district court first undertook a review of the circuit split as it stood in 1975, and
then concluded that the more liberal view of vertical commonality better reflected the broad
remedial purposes of the securities laws. Id. at 257. Similarly, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has not yet definitively spoken on the issue. Nevertheless, in Meredith v. Conticommodity
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Though they differ in degree of application, the views of the circuits re-
quiring vertical commonality generally reflect a broader view on what can
constitute a common enterprise for purposes of the Howey definition of an
investment contract. The opinions generally begin with a discussion of the
Howey test, and then attempt to fit the facts in the cases before them into the
requisite Howey elements. In Howey, the Supreme Court emphasized that it
desired a flexible application of its definition of an investment contract be-
cause Congress intended the securities laws to be remedial in nature.9 6 The
Supreme Court did not want to adopt a rigid rule, stating that such rigidity
would only lead to the invention of schemes to circumvent it.97 The Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits generally recognize this concern.
In these circuits, the definition of common enterprise is easily met by
plaintiffs who desire to bring suit against discretionary commodity account
brokers under the federal securities laws. For example, in what has been
called the Tenth Circuit's leading case on the issue, Commercial Iron &
Metal,98 the plaintiff and defendant were arguably engaged in nothing more
than the purchase and delivery of copper. Nevertheless, the court stated
that the arrangement could constitute an investment contract by applying an
expansive interpretation of the Howey definition.99 Similarly, in the Fifth
Circuit's leading case, SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., " the plain-
tiff's had purchased so-called "naked options" contracts with the defendants,
and did not technically invest in discretionary trading accounts. Again, the
court applied a liberal interpretation of the Howey definition of common en-
terprise and held that the broker-investor relationship in the Continental
Commodities case was sufficient to establish a common enterprise and invest-
ment contract. 101 This relative ease of access to the securities laws contrasts
sharply with the difficulty faced by investors in jurisdictions that require
multiple investors and a pooling of funds before a common enterprise can
exist.
A Horizontal Commonality
The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have, in separate decisions, con-
cluded that a pooling of funds among several investors toward a common
Services, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,701 (D.D.C. 1980), the District of Columbia
District Court adopted a position similar to that of the First Circuit.
96. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
97. Id.
98. 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973). See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
99. 478 F.2d at 42.
100. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
101. 497 F.2d at 521.
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venture, or "horizontal commonality," must exist for the establishment of a
common enterprise for Howey definitional purposes. The decisions in this
group of circuits reflect a uniformity of application of one version of hori-
zontal commonality that began in the Seventh Circuit. 102
In Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,'o3 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit set forth its definition of horizontal commonal-
ity. In Milnarik, the plaintiffs opened a discretionary commodity trading
account with the defendants and deposited more than $13,000. 04 The
agent, with whom they dealt and M-S Commodities itself maintained many
similar accounts with other investors.15 After losing every penny of their
initial investment while the defendants had earned commissions on trades,
plaintiffs initiated an action to rescind their agreements and recover their
losses.'° 6 Milnarik and the other investors intended to show that their dis-
cretionary commodity trading accounts constituted securities, and that M-S
Commodities violated the law because they had not registered the accounts
with the SEC.
10 7
A lower court dismissed the action, stating that the account constituted a
private, not a public offering, and therefore did not meet the definition of
security. 10 8 On appeal, then Circuit Judge John Paul Stevens wrote a major-
ity opinion affirming the lower court ruling.'O9 Relying heavily on the dis-
trict court's opinion, Judge Stevens stated that he based his decision on the
lack of a common enterprise between the investors and brokers." 0 He
quoted the district court opinion with approval regarding its statement that
no matter how many other discretionary commodity accounts were under
the defendant's control at any one time, the relationship with each investor
remained "unitary in nature."'' Judge Stevens also noted that the M-S
102. Because the Seventh Circuit is consistently addressing issues involving commodity
trading in Chicago, a leading authority states that its opinions on the subject are very persua-
sive in the way that the Second Circuit's opinions on securities laws are also persuasive due to
their addressing of stock trading in New York. Bromberg, supra note 2, at 252.
103. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). See United States v.
Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries,
Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1984). "This Circuit has strictly adhered to the 'horizontal'
test of common enterprise, under which multiple investors must pool their investments and
receive pro rata profits." Id. The case involved an investor who purchased paintings from the
defendant gallery allegedly after the defendant promised the art would rise in value. Id.





109. Id. at 280.
110. Id. at 276-79.
111. Id. at 277.
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Commodities agent did not uniformly trade the accounts, he did not pool
any of the investor funds and that each of the investors could earn a profit or
take a loss without any effect on the others.' 12 Given these facts, a simple
agency for hire, not a common enterprise, existed in this relationship." 3
Turning to the factual situation in the Howey decision for additional sup-
port, Judge Stevens noted that while each individual in Howey received a
portion of the net profits of harvest based on the amount of fruit on the
person's individual parcel of land, the "economic realities" of the Howey
investment scheme reflected a common enterprise among a group of inves-
tors who had all pooled their funds toward one common venture." 4 He
noted, in particular, that no one investor in the Howey citrus grove had any
right to the fruit on his parcel of land.' 5 Instead, all of the fruit was pooled
at harvest. 1 6 These factual distinctions regarding the Howey pooling ar-
rangement led Judge Stevens to conclude that a pooling of resources was
necessary before a common enterprise could exist."
7
Five years later in Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc. " the Seventh Cir-
cuit reaffirmed its Milnarik decision and stated explicitly that either a pool-
ing of funds or the sharing of profits on a pro-rata basis must be present to
satisfy its definition of common enterprise. "' Surprisingly, the facts in Hirk
seem to indicate that such an arrangement did exist. The plaintiff opened a
discretionary commodity account with the defendants. While defendants
would have complete control over the trading in the account, they would
also share twenty-five percent of the profits earned through the trading.'2 °
Although the "seventy-five to twenty-five" profit sharing arrangement ap-
pears to have met at least a dictionary definition of common venture, the
court in Hirk stated specifically that not "every conceivable dictionary defi-
nition of an investment contract was intended to be included within the stat-
utory definition of security."'' Hirk contended that horizontal
commonality ran counter to the remedial nature of the securities laws by
making it difficult for discretionary commodity trading account investors to
112. Id. at 278.
113. Id. at 277.
114. Id. at 278-79.
115. Id. at 279 n.7.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 279 n.7.
118. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
119. Id. at 101.
120. Id. at 102.
121. Id. (quoting Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275-76 (7th Cir.
1972)).
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invoke the securities laws.' 22 He asked the court to adopt instead the verti-
cal commonality requirement of the Fifth Circuit. 123 The court refused to
do so stating that there was "little or no substantiation for the Fifth Circuit's
position" that pooling was unnecessary,124 and that horizontal commonality
reflected the remedial nature of the securities laws and legislative desire for
flexibility of approach.
1 25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the
same view in Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 126 In
Curran, the two plaintiffs deposited $100,000 in a discretionary commodity
trading account with the defendant. t2" They earned a substantial profit at
first, but their account soon dwindled to just $6,000. 128 In a multi-count
action against the defendants, the plaintiffs alleged losses of $175,000 while
Merrill Lynch had earned more than $44,000 in commissions.'
29
Relying heavily on the Milnarik decision, the court stated that because the
fortunes of the Currans were not linked with those of other investors who
were also dependent for their success on one venture, no common enterprise
existed. 30 The court defended the Milnarik reasoning at length' and re-
peated the view of the Seventh Circuit that the one-on-one relationship that
could characterize vertical commonality in other circuits represented only
an agency-for-hire situation and not a common enterprise.
32
122. Id. at 100.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 101.
125. Id. at 102.
126. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), afid, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). For continued vitality of the
definition of common enterprise in the Sixth Circuit, see Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Com-
mercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1124 (1981) (loan participation agreement held not a security because it failed the last prong of
the Howey test, but a common enterprise did exist because the relationship between broker
and investors met the criteria of the approach taken in the Curran decision); SEC v. Profes-
sional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 354 (6th Cir. 1984) ("This court... has held that there must be
a common enterprise between investors, or horizontal commonality . . . [that] ties the for-
tunes of each investor in a pool of investors to the success of the overall venture."); Hart v.
Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984) (model home sale-leaseback
scheme held not a security because horizontal commonality did not exist between broker and
investors); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 529 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1981)
("This Court believes that such an arrangement [promissory note] is not sufficient to constitute
a common venture due to the lack of a pooling of funds.").
127. Curran, 622 F.2d at 220.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 224.
131. Id. at 222-25. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for criticism of the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning.
132. Curran, 622 F.2d at 223.
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Despite the circuit split evident in the Curran appeals court opinion, the
Supreme Court did not resolve the controversy when it granted certiorari.
The defendant argued on review 133 that a private right of action existed
under the Commodity Exchange Act. The Sixth Circuit held that such an
action did exist, 134 and the Supreme Court agreed. 35 The circuit split on
the commonality issue that had to be apparent from the vigorous discussion
of horizontal versus vertical commonality in the Sixth Circuit opinion,
36
however, was not mentioned by the Supreme Court.
In the oft-cited Third Circuit district court case of Wasnowic v. Chicago
Board of Trade, 37 the court also relied extensively on the Milnarik opinion
and found that because the individual investor discretionary commodity
trading accounts involved in the dispute were maintained separately, and
because the profits of one investor did not depend on the profits earned by
the group as a whole, no horizontal commonality existed. 3  The plaintiff,
like those in Curran, attempted to show that his broker had actually com-
mingled funds from other accounts in violation of the original agreement
and that this produced the requisite pooling of funds for the establishment of
133. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). Before Con-
gress arguably expanded the CFTC's jurisdiction to include all forms of dealings in commodi-
ties futures trading, § 2 of the CEA included only specified agricultural commodities. Id. at
360. These commodities included wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, and other agricultural
staples. Id. at 360 n. 12. The amendments to the CEA in 1974 radically changed § 2 of the
Act. Id. at 365. It now provides that the CFTC has jurisdiction over "commodities," with
that word defined, in relevant part, as:
[A]II services, rights and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently
or in the future dealt in: Provided, That the [CFTC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction
• . . with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving contracts
of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market
designated pursuant to Section 7 of this title ....
7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1985). This expanded jurisdictional definition allows CFTC regu-
lation of contracts for copper, plywood, metals, the traditional agricultural products, and
newer instruments such as heating oil futures. In addition, by using the words "accounts" and
"transactions" in its definition, it can be argued that Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction
over discretionary commodity trading accounts in the CFTC. See Mallen v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 605 F. Supp. 1105 (N.D. Ga. 1985); see also Johnson, The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1976).
134. Curran, 622 F.2d at 235.
135. Curran, 456 U.S. at 356.
136. Curran, 622 F.2d at 222-25.
137. 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972). See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982) where the court said that a discretionary commodity
trading account does not meet the Howey definition of an investment contract because "such
an account is not an investment in a common enterprise. Here, as in Wasnowic, the investment
made by Mr. Salcer was not part of a pooled group of funds and thus does not meet the second
part of the Howey test." Id. at 460.
138. Wasnowic, 352 F. Supp. at 1068-69.
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horizontal commonality. 139 The court rejected this argument stating that
the parties originally intended separation of accounts, and that original in-
tention, as with any other contract, determined the question for the court. "4
The plaintiff also attempted to distinguish his case from the Milnarik deci-
sion on the grounds that his was an action for fraud under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, while Milnarik involved an alleged registration viola-
tion of the Securities Act of 1933.4 ' The court did not agree with his argu-
ment.142  Most significantly, the court plainly rejected the plaintiff's
contention that the Third Circuit should adopt the vertical commonality
standard announced by the Second Circuit in the Maheu and Berman
cases. 14 3 Judge Nealon opined that the Milnarik view was more consistent
with that expressed by the Supreme Court in Howey.'4
As noted earlier, the courts that have adopted the horizontal commonality
approach reflect a unity of application of that test, unlike the divergent views
of the vertical commonality circuits. 4" The Third and Sixth Circuits relied
extensively on the leading Seventh Circuit cases to reach the conclusion that
horizontal commonality is necessary to the existence of an investment con-
tract.146 Each adheres to the principle that a common enterprise must in-
clude a pooling of funds among investors united in a common venture before
an investment contract will exist. Unlike courts in the vertical commonality
circuits, no courts adopting the horizontal approach have modified the Sev-
enth Circuit test for horizontal commonality.14 7 The Third, Sixth, and Sev-
enth Circuits also remain united in the belief that this horizontal
commonality approach represents a truer reading of the facts of the Howey
investment scheme. These circuits contend that the investors in Howey
pooled their respective financial resources in one common venture and
shared in the profits of that venture on a pro-rata basis.' 4 '
The holding in these circuits also evidences a desire to limit the number of
139. Id. at 1070.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1069-70.
142. Id. at 1070.
143. Id. at 1068. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
144. 352 F. Supp. at 1068. The judge reasoned that the facts in Howey, a group of investors
pooling funds in common effort to produce oranges, were closer to horizontal than vertical
commonality. Id.
145. The circuits that employ vertical commonality to find a common enterprise are di-
vided over whether the broad view of the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits should prevail over
the narrower view of vertical commonality in the Ninth Circuit. The Second Circuit remains
divided on this point. See, e.g., notes 44.101 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 126-44 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., supra notes 103, 126, 137, and cases cited therein.
148. See, e.g., Milnarik, discussed supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
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different investment schemes that could qualify as securities. Together the
courts rely on a literal application of the term "common" enterprise. Invok-
ing the Howey admonition that substance should override form and the eco-
nomic realities of a broker-investor relationship should direct the court's
analysis, these circuits contend that the one-on-one vertical commonality re-
lationship reflects only a unitary, agency-for-hire situation. 4 9
This requirement will generally cause trouble for investors in discretion-
ary commodity trading accounts. Often, these accounts are opened with
large brokerage firms that handle many other such accounts and it would be
very difficult, if investor funds are segregated, to establish the pooling ele-
ment of horizontal commonality.
III. TOWARD A UNIFORM APPROACH
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Mordaunt case leaves un-
changed the position of investors injured by fraudulent discretionary com-
modity account trading. 50 Depending upon the jurisdiction where the
dispute arises, these investors may or may not have the ability to invoke the
sanctions and protections of the securities laws against unscrupulous bro-
kers. This unfortunate situation is inconsistent with either the flexible ap-
proach to the securities laws desired by the Howey court' 5 ' or the broad,
remedial purposes Congress intended for the securities laws.152 A resolution
of this definitive split in circuits would place discretionary commodity ac-
count investors and brokers alike on firm ground, allowing each to predict
accurately what the law will require from their relationship. A uniform ap-
proach to the determination of whether a common enterprise exists would
also spare judges the task of reviewing the confused state of the law each
time a discretionary commodity trading account dispute is before the courts.
Moreover, clarification of the law will increase judicial efficiency and im-
prove public protection.
A. To Adopt Horizontal Commonality
It may be argued that the horizontal commonality test best adheres to
developments in the area of commodities trading and the mandate of the
Howey decision. First, because of the limited reach of the Commodities Ex-
149. See, e.g., Curran, discussed supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
150. Mordaunt, 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985) (White, J.
with Burger, C.J. & Brennan, J. dissenting). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). See supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
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change Act (CEA) of 1935 prior to the 1974 and 1982 amendments to it,
discretionary commodity account investors could not reasonably expect to
use this law to remedy losses or sue for damages against brokers.' 53 How-
ever, with the establishment of the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC), I54 the broadening of the scope of the Commodities Exchange
Act,' and the Supreme Court's recognition of a private right of action
under the CEA,' 5 6 courts arguably need not stretch the securities laws to
encompass discretionary commodity trading accounts.' 57 In fact, a literal
reading of the wording of the 1974 amendments to the CEA actually pre-
cludes SEC jurisdiction over these accounts.' 8 Former CFTC Chairman
Phillip Johnson stated unequivocally that his former agency has sole juris-
diction over discretionary commodity trading accounts.' 59 Some district
courts have interpreted the amendments in the same way. I"° In addition,
Congress created the CFTC with broad powers to register and to regulate
commodities brokers.' 61 At least two commentators have suggested that
153. See supra note 133.
154. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was established by the Con-
gress in 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). It began operations as a federal
agency on April 21, 1975. See generally 2 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION 2-7
(1982).
155. See supra note 133.
156. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
157. Note, Discretionary Accounts, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401 (1977) (author argues that
the need for the securities laws to cover discretionary commodity trading accounts has less-
ened as a result of the developments in commodities laws and regulations). Id. at 413.
158. See supra note 133.
159. 2 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION at 50. "The [CFTC] staff has taken the
position that discretionary commodity accounts are within the exclusive jurisdiction provision
of section 2(a)(l)."
160. See Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F. Supp. at 1114.
[J]udicial application of a securities statute to a commodity transaction would force
careful commodity brokers to see that the investment vehicle is registered as if it were
regulated by the SEC at the same time that the board of exchange is seeking approval
as a contract market under actual regulation by the CFTC. This judicial creation of
a dual system of regulatory compliance is antithetical to the congressional purpose in
creating the CFTC.
Id.; see also Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev.
1980) (1974 amendments preclude application of securities laws to commodities transactions);
accord Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bartels v. Interna-
tional Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith v.
Prometco Co., 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,867 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
161. See generally 2 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION (1982) (author describes
the reach of the CFTC regulatory sphere, wherein the CFTC provides an administrative arbi-
tration procedure for injured investors). The agency's jurisdiction extends to include all com-
modities, id. at 34, trading professionals, id. at 35, leverage contract merchants, id. at 37, and
commodity trading advisors and commodity pool operators, id. at 51, among others. Its rules
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these CFTC procedures provide sufficient relief to an injured discretionary
commodity account investor.1 62 Presumably such an investor could now
bring an action against a broker or brokerage house either directly under the
CEA or impliedly through the private right of action under the Act recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Curran.163 In fact, it could be argued that
investors need not even allege the existence of an investment contract when
seeking a remedy for fraud or other abuse of their discretionary commodity
trading account because of the opportunity to seek relief through a private
right of action under the CEA. Investors can seek compensatory damages,
as they can under the 1933 and 1934 securities laws.
In addition to developments suggesting a lessened need to expand the
scope of the securities laws to encompass discretionary commodity trading
accounts, the horizontal commonality requirement may reflect a truer read-
ing of the factual situation presented to the Supreme Court by the Howey
citrus investment plan. In Howey, investors joined together in common ven-
ture in one citrus grove directed by one promoter.' 64 The venture generated
profits through the pooling of the harvest from all of the investors' parcels of
land with profits distributed back to the investors according to their contri-
bution to the overall success of the harvest. 165 The Milnarik and Hirk deci-
sions relied heavily on these facts to reach the conclusion that a common
enterprise could not exist without a pooling of funds.
166
The Howey court also emphasized that courts should review the economic
realities of an investment scheme rather than its form when identifying a
common enterprise.' 6 7 In Howey, the individual investors could not, in a
practical sense, have used the miniscule fractions of land that they actually
owned to earn a profit.'68 Instead, each small plot became economically
viable only when joined with the plots of all of the other investors and the
promoter in a common venture involving a 500-acre citrus grove., 69 It
would seem reasonable, then, to conclude as the horizontal commonality
circuits have, that a pooling of investor funds in a common venture must be
regulate day-to-day operations of the commodity exchanges including recordkeeping and re-
porting rules, id. at 64, customer funds segregation, id. at 63, expertise standards, id. at 66, and
ethical standards, id. at 72.
162. See, Note, supra note 157, at 414-15; Hodes & Dreyfus, Discretionary Trading Ac-
counts in Commodities Futures-Are They Securities? 30 Bus. LAW. 99, 109-10 (1974).
163. See supra discussion at notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 103-25 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
168. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
169. Id. at 300.
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present before a common enterprise can exist.' 7 ° The Howey factual situa-
tion does not suggest explicitly that a one-on-one investor-broker relation-
ship could meet the criteria for a common enterprise.
As one commentator has noted, the Howey decision does not suggest that
one investor should receive less access to the securities laws than a group of
investors, nor does the Seventh Circuit, in its leading cases on the subject,
adequately address this issue.' 7 ' Yet, if horizontal commonality becomes
the uniform requirement for an investment contract, this untenable position
would relegate individual discretionary commodity account investors to sec-
ond class status. If they are not members of a larger group of investors
whose funds are pooled together, then they could not avail themselves of the
remedies available under the federal securities laws.
However, given the broader protections afforded investors by the ex-
panded reach of the commodities laws and regulations of the CFTC, and the
literal reading of the facts in the Howey investment scheme suggesting that a
multiplicity of investors and pooling of funds must exist for the establish-
ment of a common enterprise, it could be reasoned that the horizontal com-
monality approach of the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits presents the
view that the Supreme Court should adopt to resolve the split in circuits.
However, stronger reasons exist to the contrary.
B. To Adopt the Vertical Commonality Approach
While the leading opinions of the circuits that adopt horizontal common-
ality state that their approach adheres to the remedial purposes intended for
the securities laws, it nonetheless remains true that an injured investor will
find it out of the ordinary that horizontal commonality will exist in a discre-
tionary commodity trading account.' 7 2 With this in mind, it is difficult to
understand why such a restrictive definition of common enterprise can be
interpreted to be closer to the Congress' intended purposes for the securities
laws or to the flexible approach the Howey court envisioned for its definition
of investment contract.' 7 3 The Howey court specifically stated that it fa-
vored flexibility to strict formulae because investment promoters could al-
ways find new schemes to circumvent the latter.'74 Discretionary
commodity trading account brokers need only keep investor funds segre-
170. The Howey court overturned lower court rulings that held pooling necessary. Howey,
328 U.S. at 294.
171. See Comment, Securities: Defining Investment Contracts-Alternatives for Arizona,
1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 489, 500.
172. See Bromberg, supra note 2, at 248.
173. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
174. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-301.
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gated to defeat the horizontal commonality requirement. In contrast, the
broad definition of vertical commonality adopted by the Fifth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits would encompass any investment scheme that would meet
the horizontal commonality requirements as well as almost any investor-
broker relationship in a discretionary commodity trading account. This
broad-minded approach surely adheres more closely to the remedial pur-
poses of Congress and the flexible approach of the Howey court.
In addition, the requirements for vertical commonality actually track the
factual situation of the Howey citrus investment scheme more closely than
the criteria for its counterpart, horizontal commonality. As a district court
in the Second Circuit pointed out in Maheu, '" the Howey decision specifi-
cally overturned lower court rulings that stated pooling of funds must be
present before an investment contract can exist.1 76 The Supreme Court in
Howey made no mention of a pooling requirement.
Moreover, investors in Howey received their share of the profits based on
the fruit harvested from their individual fractions of land. 177 An investor
could then succeed or fail based on his individual part of the harvest without
the concomitant success or failure of any other investor or the promoter. A
poor harvest on one investor's parcel of land would not affect the profits
earned by the other investors or the promoter. This strongly suggests that
the formulation of vertical commonality by the Ninth Circuit runs contrary
to the actual facts of Howey. The Ninth Circuit requires that the success or
failure of both investor and promoter must be interwoven in order to recog-
nize a common enterprise. 178 Similarly, in Hirk the Seventh Circuit sug-
gested that such interdependence may be necessary. 179  The broader
definition of vertical commonality employed in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits represents a more consistent approach given the remedial intent of
Congress in enacting the securities laws and the broad application of them
envisioned in Howey. The Ninth Circuit's more restrictive approach is con-
sistent with neither.
Another factor that suggests the adoption of the broad definition of verti-
cal commonality as a uniform approach is that the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 together represent more than one
hundred years of a developed body of law, as opposed to the relatively new
jurisdiction granted to the CFTC. Persons injured at the hands of unscrupu-
175. 282 F. Supp. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying
text.
176. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
177. Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.
178. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
179. See the discussion of Hirk, supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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lous discretionary commodity account brokers can bring actions under the
securities laws which are more familiar to the courts, possibly resulting in
more predictable outcomes than those in actions brought under the com-
modities laws. In addition, the deterrent effect on fraudulent practices that
would develop from potential dual liability under both the securities and
commodities laws could also aid the investor. This is particularly true for
discretionary commodity account investors given the complexities of the vol-
atile commodities futures markets that make misrepresentation and fraud
much easier to perpetrate against an unwary investor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The sanctions, protections, and remedies of the 1933 and 1934 securities
laws are available to discretionary commodity trading account investors if
they can demonstrate that their accounts are investment contracts. The
Supreme Court has enunciated a three-part test to determine the existence of
an investment contract. A deep federal circuit split, however, has developed
over the second element of that three-part test-the definition of a common
enterprise. The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have established that pro-
moter dominance over investor funds or a broad vertical commonality will
suffice to create a common enterprise. On the other hand, the Third, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits require that a pooling of funds of multiple investors or
horizontal commonality, must exist to establish a common enterprise. The
Ninth Circuit stands alone with a restrictive definition of vertical commonal-
ity that requires the broker and the investor to be mutually dependent upon
one another for profits and losses. This circuit split places discretionary
commodity trading account investors in a difficult position.
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case involving whether
discretionary commodity trading accounts constitute investment contracts
and resolve the deep circuit split that has developed over the common enter-
prise element of the definition of such a contract. The settlement of this
dispute would aid the courts, practitioners, and investors alike. It would
also resolve the ongoing dispute between the SEC and CFTC concerning
jurisdiction of these accounts.
To best serve the interest of public protection and the remedial purposes
intended for the securities laws by the Congress, the Court should resolve
this split in favor of the broad definition of vertical commonality espoused by
the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. This definition provides investors the
greatest access to the remedies provided by the securities laws. While a pri-
vate right of action under the CEA does exist and commodity brokers might
be liable under both the CEA and the securities laws, it would be preferrable
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for investors to be able to use the threat of dual liability to deter fraud. The
broad definition of vertical commonality also provides the most flexibility to
encompass the broadest range of investment schemes and avoids the pitfalls
inherent in the developments of a strict formula, warned against more than
forty years ago in the Howey decision.
John Letteri

